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Abstract— This paper proposes an intrusion detection and 
prediction system based on uncertain and imprecise inference 
networks and its implementation. Giving a historic of sessions, it 
is about proposing a method of supervised learning doubled of a 
classifier permitting to extract the necessary knowledge in order 
to identify the presence or not of an intrusion in a session and in 
the positive case to recognize its type and to predict the possible 
intrusions that will follow it. The proposed system takes into 
account the uncertainty and imprecision that can affect the 
statistical data of the historic. The systematic utilization of an 
unique probability distribution to represent this type of 
knowledge supposes a too rich subjective information and risk to 
be in part arbitrary. One of the first objectives of this work was 
therefore to permit the consistency between the manner of which 
we represent information and information which we really 
dispose. Besides, our system integrates host intrusion detection 
and network intrusion prediction in the setting of a global anti-
intrusions system capable to function like a HIDS (Host based 
Intrusion Detection System) before functioning like NIPS 
(Network based Intrusion Prediction System). The so proposed 
anti-intrusions system permits to combine two powerful tools 
together to permit a reliable host intrusion detection leading to 
an as reliable network intrusion prediction. In our contribution, 
we chose to do a supervised learning based on Bayesian networks. 
The choice of modeling the historic of data with Bayesian 
networks is dictated by the nature of learning data (statistical 
data) and the modeling power of Bayesian networks. However, 
taking into account the incompleteness that can affect the 
knowledge of parameters characterizing the statistical data and 
the set of relations between phenomena, the proposed system in 
the present work uses for the inference process a propagation 
method based on a bayesian possibilistic hybridization. The so 
proposed system is adapted to the modeling of reliability with 
taking into account imprecision.  
Keywords-uncertainty; imprecision; host intrusion detection; 
network intrusion prediction; Bayesian networks; bayesian 
possibilistic hybridization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of Internet access to every network 
device, the use of distributed rather than centralized 
computing resources, and the introduction of network-enabled 
applications has rendered traditional network-based security 
infrastructures vulnerable to serious attacks. 
Intrusion detection can be defined as the process of 
identifying malicious behavior that targets a network and its 
resources [1]. Malicious behavior is defined as a system or 
individual action which tries to use or access to computer 
system without authorization and the privilege excess of those 
who have legitimate access to the system. The term attack can 
be defined as a combination of actions performed by a 
malicious adversary to violate the security policy of a target 
computer system or a network domain [2]. Each attack type is 
characterized by the use of system vulnerabilities based on 
some feature values. Usually, there are relationships between 
attack types and computer system characteristics used by the 
intruder. If we are able to reveal those hidden relationships, we 
will be able to predict the attack type.  
From another side, an attack generally starts with an 
intrusion to some corporate network through a vulnerable 
resource and then launching further actions on the network 
itself. Therefore, we can define the attack prediction process 
as the sequence of elementary actions that should be 
performed in order to recognize the attack strategy. The use of 
distributed and coordinated techniques in attacks makes their 
detection more difficult. Different events and specific 
information must be gathered from all sources and combined 
in order to identify the attack plan. Therefore, it is necessary to 
develop an advanced attack strategies prediction system that 
can detect attack strategies so that appropriate responses and 
actions can be taken in advance to minimize the damages and 
avoid potential attacks. 
Besides, the proposed anti-intrusions system should take 
into account the uncertainty that can affect the data. The 
uncertainty on parameters can have two origins [3]. The first 
source of uncertainty comes from the uncertain character of 
information that is due to a natural variability resulting from 
stochastic phenomena. This uncertainty is called variability or 
stochastic uncertainty. The second source of uncertainty is 
related to the imprecise and incomplete character of  
information due to a lack of knowledge. This uncertainty is 
called epistemic uncertainty. The systematic utilization of an 
unique probability distribution to represent this type of 
knowledge supposes a too rich subjective information and risk 
to be in part arbitrary. The system proposed here offers a 
formal setting adapted to treat the uncertainty and imprecision, 
while combining probabilities and possibilities. 
In this paper we propose an intrusion detection and 
prediction system which recognizes an upcoming intrusion 
and predicts the attacker’s attack plan and intentions. In our 
approach, we apply graph techniques based on bayesian 
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reasoning for learning. We further apply inference to 
recognize the attack type and predict upcoming attacks. The 
inference process is based on hybrid propagation that takes 
into account both the uncertain and imprecise character of 
information. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several researchers have been interested in using Bayesian 
network to develop intrusion detection and prediction systems. 
Axelsson in [5] wrote a well-known paper that uses the 
Bayesian rule of conditional probability to point out the 
implications of the base-rate fallacy for intrusion detection. It 
clearly demonstrates the difficulty and necessity of dealing 
with false alarms [6]. In [7], a model is presented that 
simulates an intelligent attacker using Bayesian techniques to 
create a plan of goal-directed actions. 
In [8], a naïve Bayesian network is employed to perform 
intrusion detection on network events. A naïve Bayesian 
network is a restricted network that has only two layers and 
assumes complete independence between the information 
nodes (i.e., the random variables that can be observed and 
measured). Kruegel in [6] proposed an event classification 
scheme that is based on Bayesian networks. Bayesian 
networks improve the aggregation of different model outputs 
and allow one to seamlessly incorporate additional 
information. 
Johansen in [9] suggested a Bayesian system which would 
provide a solid mathematical foundation for simplifying a 
seemingly difficult and monstrous problem that today’s 
Network IDS (NIDS) fail to solve. The Bayesian Network IDS 
(BNIDS) should have the capability to differentiate between 
attacks and the normal network activity by comparing metrics 
of each network traffic sample. Govindu in [10] wrote a paper 
which discusses the present state of Intrusion Detection 
Systems and their drawbacks. It highlights the need of 
developing an Intrusion Prediction System, which is the future 
of intrusion detection systems. It also explores the possibility 
of bringing intelligence to the Intrusion Prediction System by 
using mobile agents that move across the network and use 
prediction techniques to predict the behavior of user. 
III. INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREDICTION SYSTEM 
The detection of certain attacks against a networked 
system of computers requires information from multiple 
sources. A simple example of such an attack is the so-called 
doorknob attack. In a doorknob attack the intruder’s goal is to 
discover, and gain access to, insufficiently-protected hosts on 
a system. The intruder generally tries a few common account 
and password combinations on each of a number of 
computers. These simple attacks can be remarkably successful 
[12]. An Intrusion Detection system, as the name suggests, 
detect possible intrusions [13]. An IDS installed on a network 
is like a burglar alarm system installed in a house. Through 
various methods, both detect when an intruder/attacker/burglar 
is present. Both systems issue some type of warning in case of 
detection of presence of burglar/intrusion [10]. 
There are two general methods of detecting intrusions into 
computer and network systems: anomaly detection and 
signature recognition [13,14]. Anomaly detection techniques 
establish a profile of the subject’s normal behavior (norm 
profile), compare the observed behavior of the subject with its 
norm profile, and signal intrusions when the subject’s 
observed behavior differs significantly from its norm profile. 
Signature recognition techniques recognize signatures of 
known attacks, match the observed behavior with those known 
signatures, and signal intrusions when there is a match. 
Systems that use misuse-based techniques contain a number of 
attack descriptions, or ‘signatures’, that are matched against a 
stream of audit data looking for evidence of the modeled 
attacks. The audit data can be gathered from the network [15], 
from the operating system [16], or from application log files 
[6]. 
IDSs are usually classified as host-based or network-based. 
Host-based systems use information obtained from a single 
host (usually audit trails), while network based systems obtain 
data by monitoring the trace of information in the network to 
which the hosts are connected [17]. 
A simple question that will arise is how can an Intrusion 
Detection System possibly detect every single unknown 
attack? Hence the future of intrusion detection lies in 
developing an Intrusion Prediction System [10]. Intrusion 
Prediction Systems must be able to predict the probability of 
intrusions on each host of a distributed computer system. 
Prediction techniques can protect the systems from new 
security breaches that can result from unknown methods of 
attacks. In an attempt to develop such a system, we propose a 
global anti-intrusions system which detects and predicts 
intrusions based on hybrid propagation in Bayesian networks . 
IV. BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
A Bayesian network is a graphical modeling tool used to 
model decision problems containing uncertainty. It is a 
directed acyclic graph where each node represents a discrete 
random variable of interest. Each node contains the states of 
the random variable that it represents and a conditional 
probability table (CPT) which give conditional probabilities of 
this variable such as realization of other connected variables, 
based upon Bayes rule: 
Π(Β|Α)=Π(Α|Β)Π(Β)/Π(Α)                          (1) 
The CPT of a node contains probabilities of the node being 
in a specific state given the states of its parents. The parent-
child relationship between nodes in a Bayesian network 
indicates the direction of causality between the corresponding 
variables. That is, the variable represented by the child node is 
causally dependent on the ones represented by its parents [18]. 
Several researchers have been interested by using Bayesian 
network to develop intrusion detection systems. Axelsson in 
[5] wrote a well-known paper that uses the Bayesian rule of 
conditional probability to point out the implications of the 
base-rate fallacy for intrusion detection. It clearly 
demonstrates the difficulty and necessity of dealing with false 
alerts.  
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Kruegel in [1] presented a model that simulates an 
intelligent attacker using Bayesian techniques to create a plan 
of goal-directed actions. An event classification scheme is 
proposed based on Bayesian networks. Bayesian networks 
improve the aggregation of different model outputs and allow 
one to seamlessly incorporate additional information. 
 Johansen in [9] suggested that a Bayesian system which 
provides a solid mathematical foundation for simplifying a 
seemingly difficult and monstrous problem that today’s 
Network IDS fail to solve. He added that Bayesian Network 
IDS should differentiate between attacks and the normal 
network activity by comparing metrics of each network traffic 
sample. 
Bayesian networks learning has several advantages. First, 
it can incorporate prior knowledge and expertise by populating 
the CPTs. It is also convenient to introduce partial evidence 
and find the probability of unobserved variables. Second, it is 
capable of adapting to new evidence and knowledge by belief 
updates through network propagation.   
A. Bayesian Network Learning Algorithm 
Methods for learning Bayesian graphical models can be 
partitioned into at least two general classes of methods: 
constraint-based search and Bayesian methods. The constraint-
based approaches [19] search the data for conditional 
independence relations from which it is in principle possible to 
deduce the Markov equivalence class of the underlying causal 
graph. Two notable constraint based algorithms are the PC 
algorithm which assumes that no hidden variables are present 
and the FCI algorithm which is capable of learning something 
about the causal relationships even assuming there are latent 
variables present in the data [19].  
Bayesian methods [21] utilize a search-and-score 
procedure to search the space of DAGs, and use the posterior 
density as a scoring function. There are many variations on 
Bayesian methods, however, most research has focused on the 
application of greedy heuristics, combined with techniques to 
avoid local maxima in the posterior density (e.g., greedy 
search with random restarts or best first searches). Both 
constraint-based and Bayesian approaches have advantages 
and disadvantages. Constraint-based approaches are relatively 
quick and possess the ability to deal with latent variables. 
However, constraint-based approaches rely on an arbitrary 
significance level to decide independencies. 
Bayesian methods can be applied even with very little data 
where conditional independence tests are likely to break down. 
Both approaches have the ability to incorporate background 
knowledge in the form of temporal ordering, or forbidden or 
forced arcs. Also, Bayesian approaches are capable of dealing 
with incomplete records in the database. The most serious 
drawback to the Bayesian approaches is the fact that they are 
relatively slow.  
In this paper, we are dealing with incomplete records in the 
database so we opted for the Bayesian approach and 
particularly for the K2 algorithm. K2 learning algorithm 
showed high performance in many research works. The 
principle of K2 algorithm, proposed by Cooper and 
Herskovits, is to define a database of variables : X1,..., Xn, 
and to build an acyclic graph directed (DAG) based on the 
calculation of local score [22]. Variables constitute network 
nodes. Arcs represent “causal” relationships between 
variables.  
K2 Algorithm used in learning step needs:  
• A given order between variables  
• and the number of parents of the node.  
K2 algorithm proceeds by starting with a single node (the 
first variable in the defined order) and then incrementally adds 
connection with other nodes which can increase the whole 
probability of network structure, calculated using the S 
function. A requested new parent which does not increase 
node probability can not be added to the node parent set. 
 
Where, for each variable Vi, ri is the number of possible 
instantiations, Nij is the j-th instantiation of C(Vi) in the 
database, qi is the number of possible instantiations for C(Vi), 
Nijk is the number of cases in D for which Vi takes the value 
Vik with C(Vi) instantiated to Nij, Nij is the sum of Nijk for all 
values of k. 
V. JUNCTION TREE INFERENCE ALGORITHM 
The most common method to perform discrete exact 
inference is the Junction Tree algorithm developed by Jensen 
[23]. The idea of this procedure is to construct a data structure 
called a junction tree which can be used to calculate any query 
through message passing on the tree. 
The first step of JT algorithm creates an undirected graph 
from an input DAG through a procedure called moralization. 
Moralization keeps the same edges, but drops the direction, 
and then connects the parents of every child. Junction tree 
construction follows four steps: 
• JT Inference Step1: Choose a node ordering. Note that 
node ordering will make a difference in the topology 
of the generated tree. An optimal node ordering with 
respect to the junction tree is NP-hard to find. 
• JT Inference Step2: Loop through the nodes in the 
ordering. For each node Xi, create a set Si of all its 
neighbours. Delete the node Xi from the moralized 
graph. 
• JT Inference Step3: Build a graph by letting each Si be 
a node. Connect the nodes with weighted undirected 
edges. The weight of an edge going from Si to Sj is |Si 
∩ Sj |. 
• JT Inference Step4: Let the junction tree be the 
maximal-weight spanning tree of the cluster graph. 
VI. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The inference in bayesian networks is the post-calculation 
of uncertainty. Knowing the states of certain variables (called 
variables of observation), the inference process determines the 
states of some other variables (called variables targets) 
(2) 
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conditionally to observations. The choice to represent the 
knowledge by probabilities only, and therefore to suppose that 
the uncertainty of the information we dispose has stochastic 
origin, has repercussions on the results of uncertainty 
propagation through the bayesian model.   
The two sources of uncertainties (stochastic - epistemic) 
must be treated in different manners. In practice, while the 
uncertain information is treated with rigorous manner by the 
classic probability distributions, the imprecise information is 
much more better treated by possibility distribution. The two 
sources of uncertainty don't exclude themselves and are often 
related (for example: imprecise measurement of an uncertain 
quantity ).   
The merely probabilistic propagation approach can 
generate some too optimistic results. This illusion is reinforced 
by the fact that information is sometimes imprecise or 
incomplete and the classic probabilistic context doesn't 
represent this type of information faithfully.   
In the section below, we will present a new propagation 
approach in bayesian networks called hybrid propagation 
combining probabilities and possibilities. The advantage of 
this approach over the classic probabilistic propagation is that 
it takes into account both the uncertain and the imprecise 
character of information.    
VII. HYBRID PROPAGATION IN BAYESIAN 
NETWORKS 
The mechanism of propagation is based on Bayesian 
model. Therefore, the junction tree algorithm is used for the 
inference in the Bayesian network. The hybrid calculation 
combining probabilities and possibilities, permits to propagate 
both the variability (uncertain information) and the 
imprecision (imprecise information). 
A. Variable Transformation from Probability to Possibility 
(TV) 
Let's consider the probability distribution p=(p1,...,pi ,...,pn) 
ordered as follows: p1>p2>…>pn. The possibility distribution 
pi=(pi1,…,pii,…,pin) according to the transformation (p→pi) 
proposed in [24] is pi1> pi2> …> pin. Every possibility is defined 
by: 
   ∀ i = 1, 2, .., n                      (3) 
Where k1=1, , ∀ i =2, 3, …, n 
B. Probability Measure and Possibility Distribution 
Let's consider a probabilistic space (Ω,A,P). For all 
measurable whole A⊆Ω, we can define its high probability 
and its low probability. In other terms the value of the 
probability P(A) is imprecise: ∀ A⊆Ω,   N(A) ≤ P(A) ≤ Π(A) 
where N(A) = 1-Π( ). 
Each couple of necessity/possibility measures (N,Π) can 
be considered as the lower and higher probability measures 
induced by a probability measure. The gap between these two 
measures reflects the imprecise character of the information. It 
is about defining a possibility distribution on a probability 
measure. This possibility distribution reflects the imprecise 
character of the true probability of the event.    
A probability measure is more reliable and informative 
when the gap between its two upper and lower terminals is 
reduced, ie imprecision on the value of the variable is reduced, 
as opposed to a measure of probability in a confidence interval 
relatively large, this probability is risky and not very 
informative. 
C. Hybrid  Propagation Process 
The hybrid propagation proceeds in three steps: 
1) Substitute probability distributions of each variable in 
the graph by probability distributions framed by measures of 
possibility and necessity, using the variable transformation 
from probability to possibility TV, applied to probability 
distributions of each variable in the graph. The gap between 
the necessity and possibility measures reflects the imprecise 
character of the true probability associated to the variable. 
2) Transformation of the initial graph to a junction tree. 
3) Uncertain and imprecise uncertainty propagation which 
consists in both : 
a) The classic probabilistic propagation of stochastic 
uncertainties in junction tree through message passing on the 
tree, and 
b) The possibilistic propagation of epistemic uncertainties 
in the junction tree. Possibilistic propagation in junction tree is 
a direct adaptation of the classic probabilistic propagation.    
Therefore, the proposed propagation method:   
1) Preserves the power of modeling of Bayesian 
networks (permits the modeling of relations between 
variables),   
2) This method is adapted to both stochastic and 
epistemic uncertainties,  
3) The result is a probability described by an interval 
delimited by possibility and necessity measures.    
VIII. HYBRID INTRUSION DETECTION AND 
PREDICTION SYSTEM 
Our anti-intrusions system operates to two different levels, 
it integrates host intrusion detection and network intrusion 
prediction.  
The intrusion detection consists in analyzing audit data of 
the host in search of attacks whose signatures are stocked in a 
signatures dataset. The intrusion prediction, consists in 
analyzing the stream of alerts resulting from one or several 
detected attacks, in order to predict the possible attacks that 
will follow in the whole network.   
Our anti-intrusions approach is based on hybrid 
propagation in Bayesian networks in order to benefit the 
power of modeling of Bayesian networks and the power of 
possibilistic reasoning to manage imprecision.    
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A. Hybrid intrusion detection 
The main objective of intrusion detection is to detect each 
security policy violation on a system of information. Signature 
Recognition approach, adopted in our contribution, analyzes 
audit data in search of attacks whose signatures are stocked in 
a signatures dataset. Audit data are data of the computer 
system that bring back information on operations led on this 
later. A signatures dataset contains a set of lines, every line 
codes a stream of data (between two definite instants) between 
a source (identified by its IP address) and a destination 
(identified also by its IP address), under a given protocol 
(TCP, UDP...). Every line is a connection characterized by a 
certain number of attributes as its length, the type of the 
protocol, etc. According to values of these attributes, every 
connection in the signatures dataset is considered as being a 
normal connection or an attack.   
In our approach, the process of intrusion detection is 
considered as a problem of classification. Given a set of  
identified connections and a set of connections types, our goal 
is to classify connections among the most plausible 
corresponding connections types.   
Our approach for intrusion detection consists in four main 
steps [30]:  
1) Important attributes selection : In a signatures 
dataset, every connection is characterized by a certain number 
of attributes as its length, the type of the protocol, etc. These 
attributes have been fixed by Lee and al. [31]. The objective of 
this step is to extract the most important attributes among 
attributes of the signatures dataset. To do so, we proceeded by 
a Multiple Correspondences Factorial Analysis (MCFA) of 
attributes of the dataset, then we calculated the Gini index for 
every attribute of the dataset in order to visualize the different 
attributes distribution and to select the most important 
attributes [32]. It results a set of the most important attributes 
characterizing connections of the signatures dataset. Some of 
these attributes can be continuous and can require to be 
discretized to improve classification results,    
2) Continuous attributes discretization : The selected 
attributes, can be discrete (admitting a finished number of 
values) or continuous. Several previous works showed that the 
discretization improved bayesian networks performances [4]. 
To discretize continuous attributes, we opted for the 
discretization by the fit together averages. it consists in cutting 
up the variable while using some successive averages as limits 
of classes. This method has the advantage to be bound 
strongly to the variable distribution, but if the variable is cut 
up a big number of time, this method risks to either produce 
some empty or very heterogeneous classes, in the case of very 
dissymmetric distributions. Thus, we use only one iteration, 
i.e. a binary discretization based on the average, but this 
supposes that the behavior of the observation variables is not 
too atypical,   
3) Bayesian network learning : The set of important 
attributes being discretized  as well as the class of connection 
types constitute the set of entry variables to the Bayesian 
network learning step. The first step is to browse the set of 
entry variables to extract their different values and to calculate 
their probabilities. Then, we use the K2 probabilistic learning 
algorithm to build the Bayesian network for intrusion 
detection. The result is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes 
are the entry variables and edges denote the conditional 
dependences between these variables. To each variable of the 
graph is associated a conditional probability table that 
quantifies the effect of its parents,   
4) Hybrid propagation in Bayesian network : consists in 
the three steps mentioned previously. 
At the end of this step, every connection (normal or 
intrusion) in a host is classified in the most probable 
connection type. In case of detected intrusions in a host, one or 
several alerts are sent in direction of the intrusion prediction 
module, this later is charged to predict the possible intrusions 
that can propagate in the whole network. 
B. Hybrid intrusion prediction 
The intrusion prediction aims to predict attack plans, given 
one or several intrusions detected at the level of one or several 
hosts of a computer network. An intrusion detected at the level 
of a host results to one or several alerts generated by a HIDS. 
The intrusion prediction tent to classify alerts among the most 
plausible hyper-alerts, each hyper-alert corresponds to a step 
in the  attack plan, then, based on hyper-alerts correlation, 
deducts the possible attacks that will follow in the whole 
computer network [11].   
1) Alerts Classification: The main objective of the alerts 
classification is to analyze the stream of alerts generated by 
intrusion detection systems in order to contribute in the attack 
plans prediction. In our approach, given a set of alerts, alerts 
classification's goal is to classify alerts among the most 
plausible corresponding hyper-alerts. 
Our approach for alerts classification consists in four main 
steps :  
a) Important attributes selection:  In addition to time 
information, each alert has a number of other attributes, such as 
source IP, destination IP, port(s), user name, process name, attack 
class, and sensor ID, which are defined in a standard document, 
“Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)”, drafted 
by the IETF Intrusion Detection Working Group [20]. For the  most 
important attributes selection, we proceed by a Multiple 
Correspondences Factorial Analysis (MCFA) of the different 
attributes characterizing alerts. The attributes selection doesn't 
include time stamps, we will use time stamps in the  attack plans 
prediction process in order to detect alerts series. It results of this 
step, a set of the most important attributes characterizing alerts of the 
alerts dataset,    
b) Alerts aggregation: An alerts dataset generally 
contains a big number of alerts, most are raw alerts and can 
make reference to one same event. Alerts aggregation consists 
in exploiting alerts attributes similarities in order to reduce the 
redundancy of alerts. Since alerts that are output by the same 
IDS and have the same attributes except time stamps 
correspond to the same step in the attack plan [26], we 
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aggregate alerts sharing the same sensor, the same attributes 
except time stamps in order to get clusters of alerts where each 
cluster  corresponds to only one step of the attack plan, called 
hyper-alert. Then, based on results of this first step, we merge 
clusters of alerts (or hyper-alert) corresponding to the same 
step of the attack plan. At the end of this step of alerts 
aggregation, we get, a cluster of alerts (or hyper-alert) for each 
step of the attack plan (i.e. hyper-alert = step of the attack 
plan). We regroup in one class all the observed hyper-alerts,   
c) Bayesian network learning: The set of selected 
attributes of alerts as well as the class regrouping all the 
observed hyper-alerts forms the set of entry variables to the 
Bayesian network learning step.  The first step is to browse the 
set of entry variables in order to extract their different values 
and calculate their probabilities. Then, we use the K2 
probabilistic learning algorithm to build the Bayesian network 
for alerts classification,  
d) Hybrid propagation in Bayesian network : consists in 
the three steps mentioned previously. 
At the end of this step, every generated alert is classified 
in the most probable corresponding hyper-alert. 
2) Attack plans prediction: Attack plans prediction 
consists in detecting complex attack scenarios, that is implying 
a series of actions by the attacker. The idea is to correlate 
hyper-alerts resulting from the previous step in order to 
predict, given one or several attacks detected, the possible 
attacks that will follow. 
Our approach for attack plans prediction consists in three 
main steps :  
a) Transaction data formulation [26]: we formulate 
transaction data for each hyper alert in the dataset. 
Specifically, we set up a series of time slots with equal time 
interval, denoted as ∆t, along the time axis. Given a time range 
T, we have m =   time slots. Recall that each hyper alert A 
includes a set of alert instances with the same attributes except 
time stamps, i.e., A = [a1 ,a2, …, an], where ai represents an 
alert instance in the cluster. We denote NA = {n1, n2, …, nm} as 
the variable to represent the occurrence of hyper alert A during 
the time range T, where ni is corresponding to the occurrence 
(i.e., ni = 1) or un-occurrence (i.e., ni = 0) of the alert A in a 
specific time slot , Using the above process, we can create 
a set of transaction data. Table 1 shows an example of the 
transaction data corresponding to hyper alerts A, B and C.   
TABLE I.  AN EXAMPLE OF TRANSACTION DATA SET 
Time Slot A B C 
 
1 0 0 
 
1 0 1 
 
1 1 0 
… … … … 
 
1 0 0 
 
b) Bayesian network learning: The set of the observed 
hyper-alerts forms the set of entry variables to the Bayesian 
network learning step.  The first step is to browse the set of 
entry variables to extract their different values and to calculate 
their probabilities. Then, we use the K2 probabilistic learning 
algorithm to build the Bayesian network for attack plans 
prediction. The result is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes 
are the hyper-alerts and edges denote the conditional 
dependences between these hyper-alerts. 
c) Hybrid propagation in Bayesian network : consists in 
the three steps mentioned previously. 
At the end of this step, given one or several attacks 
detected, we can predict the possible attacks that will follow. 
IX. HIDPAS SYSTEM AGENT ARCHITECTURE 
HIDPAS system architecture is composed by two 
interconnected layers of intelligent agents. The first layer is 
concerned by host intrusion detection. On each host of a 
distributed computers system an intelligent agent is charged by 
detecting intrusion eventuality. 
Each agent of the intrusion detection layer uses a signature 
intrusion database (SDB) to build its own bayesian network. 
For every new suspect connection, the intrusion detection 
agent (IDA) of the concerned host uses hybrid propagation in 
its bayesian network to infer the conditional evidences of 
intrusion given the new settings of the suspect connection. 
Therefore, based on the probability degree and the gap 
between the necessity and the possibility degrees associated 
with each connection type, we can perform quantitative 
analysis on the connection types. 
In the final selection of possible connection type, we can 
select the type who has the maximum informative probability 
value. An informative probability is a probability delimited by 
two confidence measures where the gap between them is 
under a threshold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  HIDPAS system architecture 
In case of intrusion, IDA agent informs the intrusion 
prediction agent (IPA) which is placed in the prediction layer, 
 
Network Intrusion  
Prediction Layer 
SDB 
SDB 
SDB 
IDA IDA 
IDA 
SDB 
Host Intrusion  
Detection Layer 
ADB 
IDA 
IPA 
67 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 5, No.1, 2009 
about the eventuality of intrusion on the concerned host and its 
type. 
The second layer is based upon one intelligent agent which 
is charged by network intrusion prediction. 
When the Intrusion Prediction Agent (IPA) is informed 
about a new intrusion which will be happened on a host of the 
distributed computers system and its type, it tries to compute 
conditional probabilities that other attacks may be ultimately 
happen. To accomplish this task, IPA uses another database 
type (ADB) which contains historical data about alerts 
generated by sensors from different computer systems. 
Given a stream of alerts, agent IPA first output results as 
evidences to the inference process of the first graph for alerts 
classification, second, it output results of alerts classification 
to the inference process of the second graph for attack plans 
prediction. Each path in the second graph is potentially a 
subsequence of an attack scenario. Therefore, based on the 
probability degree and the gap between the necessity and the 
possibility degrees associated with each edge, IPA can 
perform quantitative analysis on the attack strategies. 
The advantage of our approach is that we do not require a 
complete ordered attack sequence for inference. Due to 
bayesian networks and the hybrid propagation, we have the 
capability of handling partial order and unobserved activity 
evidence sets. In practice, we cannot always observe all of the 
attacker’s activities, and can often only detect partial order of 
attack steps due to the limitation or deployment of security 
sensors. For example, IDA can miss detecting intrusions and 
thus result in an incomplete alert stream.  
In the final selection of possible future goal or attack steps, 
IPA can either select the node(s) who has the maximum 
informative probability value(s) or the one(s) whose 
informative probability value(s) is (are) above a threshold.  
After computing conditional probabilities of possible 
attacks, IPA informs the system administrator about possible 
attacks. 
X. HIDPAS SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
HIDPAS was implemented using JADE multiagent 
plateform. The dataset used for intrusion detection 
implementation and experimentation is DARPA KDD’99 
which contains signatures of normal connections and 
signatures of 38 known attacks gathered in four main classes: 
DOS, R2L, U2R and Probe.  
A. DARPA’99 DATA SET 
MIT Lincoln Lab’s DARPA intrusion detection evaluation 
datasets have been employed to design and test intrusion 
detection systems. The KDD 99 intrusion detection datasets 
are based on the 1998 DARPA initiative, which provides 
designers of intrusion detection systems (IDS) with a 
benchmark on which to evaluate different methodologies [25].  
To do so, a simulation is made of a factitious military 
network consisting of three ‘target’ machines running various 
operating systems and services. Additional three machines are 
then used to spoof different IP addresses to generate traffic.  
Finally, there is a sniffer that records all network traffic 
using the TCP dump format. The total simulated period is 
seven weeks [27]. Packet information in the TCP dump file is 
summarized into connections. Specifically, “a connection is a 
sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well 
defined times, between which data flows from a source IP 
address to a target IP address under some well defined 
protocol” [27].  
DARPA KDD'99 dataset represents data as rows of 
TCP/IP dump where each row consists of computer 
connection which is characterized by 41 features. Features are 
grouped into four categories: 
1) Basic Features: Basic features can be derived from 
packet headers without inspecting the payload. 
2) Content Features: Domain knowledge is used to assess 
the payload of the original TCP packets. This includes features 
such as the number of failed login attempts; 
3) Time-based Traffic Features: These features are 
designed to capture properties that mature over a 2 second 
temporal window. One example of such a feature would be the 
number of connections to the same host over the 2 second 
interval; 
4) Host-based Traffic Features: Utilize a historical 
window estimated over the number of connections – in this 
case 100 – instead of time. Host based features are therefore 
designed to assess attacks, which span intervals longer than 2 
seconds. 
In this study, we used KDD'99 dataset which is counting 
almost 494019 of training connections. Based upon a Multiple 
Correspondences Factorial Analysis (MCFA) of attributes of 
the KDD’99 dataset, we used data about only important 
features. Table 2 shows the important features and the 
corresponding Gini index for each feature: 
TABLE II.  CONNECTIONS IMPORTANT FEATURES 
N° Feature Gini 
A23 Count 0.7518 
A5 src_bytes 0.7157 
A24 src_count 0.6978 
A3 service 0.6074 
A36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate 0.5696 
A2 protocol_type 0.5207 
A33 dst_host_srv_count 0.5151 
A35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate 0.4913 
A34 dst_host_same_srv_rate 0.4831 
 
To these features, we added the "attack_type". Indeed each 
training connection is labelled as either normal, or as an attack 
with specific type. DARPA'99 base counts 38 attacks which 
can be gathered in four main categories: 
1) Denial of Service (dos): Attacker tries to prevent 
legitimate users from using a service. 
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2) Remote to Local (r2l): Attacker does not have an 
account on the victim machine, hence tries to gain access. 
3) User to Root (u2r): Attacker has local access to the 
victim machine and tries to gain super user privileges. 
4) Probe: Attacker tries to gain information about the 
target host. 
Among the selected features, only service and protocol-
type are discrete, the other features need to be discretized. 
Table 3 shows the result of discretization of these features.   
TABLE III.  CONTINUOUS FEATURES DISCRETIZATION 
    N° Feature Values 
A23 count 
cnt_v1 
m < 332.67007446 
cnt_v2 
m ≥ 332.67007446 
A5 src_bytes 
sb_v1 
m < 30211.16406250 
sb_v2 
m  ≥ 30211.16406250 
A24 src_count 
srv_cnt_v1 
m < 293.24423218 
srv_cnt_v2 
m ≥ 293.24423218 
A36 dst_host 
dh_ssp_rate_v1 
m < 0.60189182 
dh_ssp_rate_v2 
m ≥ 0.60189182 
A33 dst_host_srv_count 
dh_srv_cnt_v1 
m < 189.18026733 
dh_srv_cnt_v2 
m ≥ 189.18026733 
A35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
dh_dsrv_rate_v1 
m < 0.03089163 
dh_dsrv_rate_v2 
m ≥ 0.03089163 
A34 dst_host_same_srv_rate 
dh_ssrv_rate_v1 
m < 0.75390255 
dh_ssrv_rate_v2 
m ≥ 0.75390255 
 
The dataset used for intrusion prediction implementation 
and experimentation is LLDOS 1.0 provided by DARPA 
2000, which is the first attack scenario example dataset to be 
created for DARPA. It includes a distributed denial of service 
attack run by a novice attacker. 
B. LLDOS 1.0 – SCENARIO ONE 
DARPA2000 is a well-known IDS evaluation dataset 
created by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. It consists of two 
multistage attack scenarios, namely LLDDOS1.0 and 
LLDOS2.02. The LLODS1.0 scenario can be divided into five 
phases as follows [29]: 
1) Phase 1: The attacker scans the network to determine 
which hosts are up. 
2) Phase 2: The attacker then uses the ping option of the 
sadmind exploit program to determine which hosts selected in 
Phase 1 are running the Sadmind service. 
3) Phase 3: The attacker attempts the sadmind Remote-
to-Root exploit several times in order to compromise the 
vulnerable machine. 
4) Phase 4: The attacker uses telnet and rpc to install a 
DDoS program on the compromised machines. 
5) Phase 5: The attacker telnets to the DDoS master 
machine and launches the mstream DDOS against the final 
victim of the attack.   
We used an alert log file [28] generated by RealSecure 
IDS. As a result of replaying the “Inside-tcpdump” file from 
DARPA 2000, Realsecure produces 922 alerts. After applying 
the proposed alerts important attributes selection, we used data 
about only important features as shown in Table4. 
TABLE IV.  ALERTS IMPORTANT FEATURES 
Feature Gini 
SrcIPAddress 0,6423 
SrcPort 0,5982 
DestIPAddress 0,5426 
DestPort 0,5036 
AttackType 0,4925 
 
After applying the proposed alerts aggregation, we 
obtained 17 different types of alerts as shown in Table5. 
TABLE V.  HYPER-ALERTS REPORTED BY REALSECURE IN LLDOS 1.0 
ID Hyper-alert Size 
1 Sadmind_Ping 
 
3 
2 TelnetTerminaltype 
 
128 
3 Email_Almail_Overflow 
 
38 
4 Email_Ehlo 
 
522 
5 FTP_User 
 
49 
6 FTP_Pass 
 
49 
7 FTP_Syst 
 
44 
8 http_Java 
 
8 
9 http_Shells 
 
15 
10 Admind 
 
17 
11 Sadmind_Amslverify_Overflow 
 
14 
12 Rsh 
 
17 
13 Mstream_ Zombie 
 
6 
14 http_ Cisco_ Catalyst_ Exec 
 
2 
15 SSH_Detected 
 
4 
16 Email_Debug 
 
2 
17 Stream_DoS 
 
1 
C. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
HIDPAS system contains three interfaces: 
1) Intrusion Detection Interface : Figure 2 shows the 
bayesian network built by AGENT ID1. For every new 
connection, AGENT ID1 uses its bayesian network to decide 
about the intrusion and its type.  
2) Alerts Classification Interface : Figure 3 shows the 
bayesian network built by the IPA for alerts classification. The 
IPA receives alerts messages sent by intrusion detection agents 
about the detected intrusions. The IPA uses its bayesian 
network to determine hyper-alerts corresponding to these 
alerts.  
3) Attack Plans Prediction Interface : Figure 4 shows the 
bayesian network built by the IPA for attack plans prediction. 
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The IPA uses its bayesian network to determine the eventual 
attacks that will follow the detected intrusions. 
 
Figure 2.  Intrusion Detection Interface 
 
Figure 3.  Alerts Classification Interface 
 
Figure 4.  Intrusion Prediction Interface 
XI. EXPERIMENTATION 
The main criteria that we have considered in the 
experimentation of our system are the detection rate, false 
alerts rate, alerts correlation rate, false positive correlation rate 
and false negative correlation rate. 
• Detection Rate: is defined as the number of examples 
correctly classified by our system divided by the total 
number of test examples. 
TABLE VI.  DETECTION RATE COMPARISON 
Detection Classic 
propagation 
Hybrid 
propagation 
Normal (60593) 99.52% 100% 
DOS (229853) 97.87% 99.93% 
Probing (4166) 89.39% 98.57% 
R2L (16189) 19.03% 79.63% 
U2R (228) 31.06% 93.54% 
 
Table 6 shows high performance of our system based on 
hybrid propagation in intrusion detection.  
• False Alerts : Bayesian networks can generate two 
types of false alerts: False negative and false positive 
alarms. False negative describe an event that the IDS 
fails to identify as an intrusion when one has in fact 
occurred. False positive describe an event, incorrectly 
identified by the IDS as being an intrusion when none 
has occurred. 
TABLE VII.  FALSE ALERTS RATE COMPARISON 
False  
alerts 
Classic 
propagation 
Hybrid 
propagation 
Normal (60593) 0.48% 0% 
DOS (229853) 1.21% 0.02% 
Probing (4166) 5.35% 0.46% 
R2L (16189) 6.96% 2.96% 
U2R (228) 6.66% 1.36% 
 
Table 7 shows the gap between false alerts results given by 
the two approaches. Hybrid propagation approach gives the 
smallest false alerts rates. 
• Correlation rate: can be defined as the rate of attacks 
correctly correlated by our system.  
• False positive correlation rate : is the rate of attacks 
correlated by the system when no relationship exists 
between them.  
• False negative correlation rate : is the rate of attacks 
having in fact relationship but the system fails to 
identify them as correlated attacks.  
Table 8 shows experimentation results about correlation 
measured by our system: 
TABLE VIII.  CORRELATION RATE COMPARISON 
 
Classic 
propagation 
hybrid 
propagation 
Correlation rate 95.5% 100% 
False positive 
correlation rate 6.3% 1.3% 
False negative 
correlation rate 4.5% 0% 
 
Table 8 shows high performance of our system based on 
hybrid propagation in attack correlation and prediction. The 
use of  hybrid propagation in bayesian networks was 
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especially useful, because we have deal with a lot of missing 
information. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we outlined a new approach based on hybrid 
propagation combining probability and possibility, through a 
bayesian network. Bayesian networks provide automatic 
learning from audit data. Hybrid propagation through bayesian 
network  provide propagation of both stochastic and epistemic 
uncertainties, coming respectively from the uncertain and 
imprecise character of information.  
The application of our system in intrusion detection 
context helps detect both normal and abnormal connections 
with very considerable rates.  
Besides, we presented an approach to identify attack plans 
and predict upcoming attacks. We developed a bayesian 
network based system to correlate attack scenarios based on 
their relationships. We conducted inference to evaluate the 
likelihood of attack goal(s) and predict potential upcoming 
attacks based on the hybrid propagation of uncertainties. 
Our system demonstrates high performance when detecting 
intrusions, correlating and predicting attacks. This is due to the 
use of bayesian networks and the hybrid propagation within 
bayesian networks which is especially useful when dealing 
with missing information. 
There are still some challenges in attack plan recognition. 
First, we will apply our algorithms to alert streams collected 
from live networks to improve our work. Second, our system 
can be improved by integrating an expert system which is able 
to provide recommendations based on attack scenarios 
prediction. 
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